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IL

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

The Trial Court Erred In Not Giving The Requested Instruction Regarding When An
Officer May Make An Arrest.
Under State v. Fetterly, 126 Idaho 475 (Ct. App. 1994), a requested
instruction must be given where: (1) it properly states the governing law; (2) a
reasonable view of the evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; (3) it is
not addressed adequately by other jury instructions; and (4) it does not constitute an
impermissible comment as to the evidence. 126 Idaho at 4 76-77. Ms. Fields's
proposed instruction met all four Fetterlyrequirements and should have been given.
1.

The proposed instruction properly states the governing law.

The state does not dispute that the first paragraph of the proposed instruction
correctly stated the law, as it existed at the time of trial.1 But it then goes on to
make the remarkable argument that an officer making an illegal arrest could be at
that same moment also "engaged in the performance of his or her duties."
Respondent's Brief, pg. 6. The state asserts the supposed duty in this case was
responding to a call about a bar fight. Id. Apparently, the state believes that so long
as a police officer starts out acting in the performance of his or her duties any
deviation from the original act is irrelevant. By this logic, however, a police officer
who investigates a domestic violence report but ends up stealing items from the
victim's purse is also "engaged in the performance of his ... duties." Consequently,
as the state's argument goes, the victim could not grab the officer's wrist in an
1

Since then, this Court has found that language to be unconstitutional insofar as it
permits a warrantless arrest "for a mere misdemeanor not committed in his
presence." State v. Clarke, --- Idaho---, 446 P.3d 451, 457 (2019)
1

attempt to retrieve her stolen wallet without committing battery on a law
enforcement officer because the officer was performing a lawful duty prior to
engaging in the unlawful act. The Court should reject this absurd interpretation of
I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) because it is not mandated by the plan language of the statute.

State v. Montgomery, No. 43795, 2017 Ida. App. LEXIS 22, at *10-11 (Ct. App. Feb.
21, 2017)
The state next contends the proposed instruction was contrary to the “analysis
of the statute” done by the Court in State v. Kelly, 158 Idaho 862, 865 (Ct. App.
2015), i.e., “that the ‘statute does not require that the officer be engaged in any
specific duty.’” Respondent’s Brief, pg. 6 quoting Kelly, 158 Idaho at 865. The state,
however, has shortened the Kelly quotation, which states in its entirety: “The
statute does not require that the officer be engaged in any specific duty--only that he

be engaged in the performance of his duties.” State v. Kelly, 158 Idaho at 865
(omitted text italicized). The missing text is critical because an officer is not engaged
in the performance of his or her duties when making an illegal arrest. To the
contrary, it is a crime for a police officer to make an unlawful arrest. Any “public
officer . . . who, under the pretense or color of any process or other legal authority,
arrests any person or detains him against his will . . . without a regular process or
other lawful authority therefor, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” I.C. § 18-703. If an
officer making an unlawful arrest is committing a crime it follows that “[a] peace
officer making an unlawful arrest is not engaged in the performance of his or her
duties,” just as the proposed instruction says. R 96. Thus, in order to adopt the
2

state’s absurd reading of I.C. § 18-915(3)(b), it would require this Court to ignore the
Legislature’s determination that making illegal arrests is not part of a police officer’s
duties, as expressed in I.C. § 18-703.
Moreover, in Kelly, the officer was not engaged in any unlawful activity at the
time Mr. Kelly hit him. Unlike this case, the officer in Kelly had the suspect
unshackled and then questioned him. (Had the police officers here followed that
example, it is unlikely any of this would have come to pass.) The officer determined
that Mr. Kelly was intoxicated and was assisting in getting him into a friend’s car.
“While being assisted into the car, Kelly stood up and punched the officer in the face
with a closed fist.” State v. Kelly, 158 Idaho at 864. The Kelly Court noted that “in
order for Kelly to be found guilty under subsection (b), the state had to prove that the
officer was performing his duty at the time he was struck and that Kelly knew or
should have known he was an officer.” Id. The Court continued, “Without question,
an officer’s duties include responding to calls for assistance and helping citizens.”

State v. Kelly, 158 Idaho at 865-66. Absent from this is any allegation that the officer
was not acting in the performance of his duties, while here the officers were
unlawfully arresting Ms. Fields. Kelly simply does not address the question
presented in this case. The court’s and the state’s reliance upon it is misplaced.
Further, the state’s reading of the statute would be contrary to the
long-standing rule that “[s]tatues that are in pari materia must be construed
together to effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the
same subject.” City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65,
3

69 (2003) (internal citation omitted). Here, both I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) and I.C. § 18-703
relate to the subject of the duties of law enforcement officers. Thus, they should be
read together. The “while in the performance” language in I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) should
be read to exclude illegal arrests in light of the criminal prohibition of illegal arrests
found in I.C. § 18-703.
The logical reading of I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) -- that a police officer is not in the
performance of his or her duties while in the midst of committing a crime -- is
supported by State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 178 (Ct. App. 1988), aff’d 115 Idaho
357, 358 (1988), where the Court found that the “duty” in I.C. § 18-705 included
“only those lawful and authorized acts of a public officer.” 114 Idaho at 180.
The state suggests that upon “closer analysis” Wilkerson does not support Ms.
Fields’s argument. Respondent’s Brief, pg. 8. But the state’s “closer analysis” is what
does not withstand scrutiny.
First, the state cites to a passage in Wilkerson where it notes that “[i]n the
arrest-resistance contexts courts have defined official duties broadly.” Respondent’s
Brief, pg. 9, quoting Wilkerson, 114 Idaho at 179, in turn quoting United States v.

Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1967). But the Wilkerson Court did not adopt
that broad definition from Helcizer, noting that “Wilkerson was not charged with
resisting arrest.” 144 Idaho at 179. Thus, what the state represents to be the
“applicable test” in arrest-resistance cases was not adopted by Wilkerson.

4

Further, the language from Heliczer referred to in Wilkerson is itself a
passage of dicta. The holding in Heliczeris that the issue was not properly preserved
for appeal. The federal court held:
Appellant's argument that the agents were not "engaged in * * * the
performance of [their] duties" is closely allied to the point already mentioned
concerning the unlawfulness of the arrest. It is his claim that if the arrest was
unlawful, the agents were not engaged in performing their official duties, and
Martin had a right to resist. Defense counsel excepted to the court's charge on
this essential element of an offense under§ 111 without giving any reason for
doing so, as required by Rule 30 F.R. Crim.P., and therefore it cannot be
assigned as error.

Id. (Emphasis added.) The passage relied upon by the state appears immediately
after the holding above and was unnecessary for the federal court's actual decision.

Id.
In addition, the trial court in Heliczer instructed the jury on the question of
whether the police could lawfully arrest the defendants. 2 The Circuit Court noted
that the federal agents did not have the power to make a warrantless arrest
pursuant to federal statutes, but had the power under New York law if there was
probable cause to believe the defendants had committed a felony. "The trial judge
properly left it to the jury to find whether or not Martin's felonious act of threatening
2

The instruction read in relevant part that the government must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the federal agents were engaged in the performance of their
official duties. It went on to say:
If you find that the defendant Martin had prior to August 11, 1965 threatened
the Government informant and that the agents were effecting Martin's arrest
for having made such a threat, then I charge you that these agents were then
and there performing their official duty.

Heliczer, 373 F.2d at 245. Unlike here, the Heliczerjury was permitted to
determine whether the arrest was in performance of the officers' official duties.
5

Cutler with death actually took place." Heliczer, 373 F.2d at 244-45. The jury found
there was probable cause and thus the arrest was lawful. Heliczer, 373 F.2d at 247.
Here, of course, the problem is that the court did not allow the jury to decide whether
the arrest of Ms. Fields was legal. Thus, the state's reliance upon Kelly and Heliczer
is misplaced.
In light of the above, this Court should conclude that the proposed jury
instruction, specifically the second paragraph, was a correct statement of the law
and that the first Fetterly requirement has been established
2.

A reasonable view of the evidence supported Ms. Fields's legal theory.

The state argues that the facts did not support the giving of the instruction
because "the first battery preceded the arrest, and the second and third battery were
committed after Fields' arrest for the first battery[.]" Respondent's Brief, pg. 4. This
argument, however, is based upon the erroneous belief that Ms. Fields was not
under arrest until the police told her she was arrested. Here, the officers arrested
Ms. Fields when they held her to the ground and handcuffed her upon arrival at the
scene. From that point on, Ms. Fields was illegally arrested. Recall that Bowman
was the first officer at the scene. T pg. 180, In. 13-20. When he arrived, Ms. Fields
was "being held down on the ground" by Trombetta, Busta, and the Hub's owner. Id.,
In. 4-11. Bowman placed Ms. Fields in handcuffs because she "was on the ground
being combative," T pg. 182, In. 1-10; that is, she was resisting the battery by the
unannounced and off-duty police officers. Ms. Fields was under arrest at this
moment. Idaho Code § 19-602 provides that, "An arrest is made by an actual
6

restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of an
officer.” Id. Ms. Fields being restrained on the ground by the police officer after being
handcuffed constituted an arrest. See State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 425 (1995)
(“Based on this totality of circumstances, we hold that by handcuffing Pannell and
placing him in a patrol car, the officers in this case employed a degree of force which
exceeded that justified for an investigatory detention and which therefore amounted
to an arrest.”)
It was not until after Ms. Fields was arrested that Bowman and Robideau
decided to move her to a patrol car. (The decision to place her in a patrol car is more
proof that she was already under arrest.) When Ms. Fields began to struggle again,
the two decided to “move her back over to the sidewalk.” T pg. 185, ln. 11. It was at
this point that Bowman saw Ms. Fields kick Robideau “[i]n the leg area.” Id., ln. 24.
Robideau then told Ms. Fields that she was under arrest. T pg. 237, ln. 2-3. But
when Robideau announced the arrest does not change the fact she was already
under arrest. See State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 923 n.1 (1974) (“Even where the
officer denies that he intended to make an arrest his actions may sufficiently
manifest an arrest[.]”), quoting Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1207 (D.C.
Cir. 1968). In fact, she was under arrest before she kicked Robideau.
Moreover, the incidents which formed the basis for Counts I and II occurred
after Robideau announced the arrest but still during the course of the illegal arrest.
Bowman said that Ms. Fields was “still being verbally combative and [was]
attempting to kick” but also said “[t]here were several points that she made contact
7

with both [him] and Deputy Robideau.” T pg. 187, ln. 4-8. Ms. Fields was put on the
sidewalk again. Her lip was bloodied during this procedure. T pg. 186, ln. 5-17.
Bowman testified that while Ms. Fields was being held on the ground, the second
time, she kicked him and made marks in his wrists with her fingernails. T pg. 190,
ln. 1-4. During this time, Ms. Fields repeatedly stated, “I didn’t do anything wrong”
and repeatedly asked “what’s my charge[?]” T pg. 217, ln. 15-22. And during closing
argument, the state appears to rely upon the touching which occurred after the
arrest was announced. It stated:
We know that she committed a battery. Actually, multiple batteries. She used
force or violence on Deputy Bowman when she kicked him, when she
scratched him. Got pictures there. She used force or violence on Deputy
Robideau when she kicked him. She scratched him. She bit him when she was
in the jail and on Corporal Pagliaro, both from this closed fist strike
(indicating) and from kicking him after that. So that's what the evidence
shows.
T pg. 376, ln. 20 – pg. 377, ln. 5.
Thus, the evidence shows that Counts I and II occurred after Ms. Fields was
illegally arrested but still during the time she was actively resisting the illegal
arrest. A rational jury could have found that the officers were not in the performance
of their duties at this point because they were still attempting to effectuate the
illegal arrest. And while Count III occurred at the jail, Ms. Fields was still being
subjected to the original illegal arrest. But even if Pagliaro was performing his
duties when the acts in Count III occurred, that does not negate the fact that
Bowman and Robideau were not performing their duties at the time of Counts I and
II.
8

3.

The proposed instruction is not adequately addressed by the court's
instructions.

The state does not dispute this factor.
4.

It does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the evidence.

A comment on the evidence is "[a] statement made to the jury or by counsel on
the probative value of certain evidence." Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition,
pg. 262 (1999). See also, Webster's New World Law Dictionary (2010) (phrase
defined as a statement "made during a trial by a judge or lawyer regarding his or her
own opinion about the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses."). That was not
the case here. The proposed jury instruction does not comment on the evidence
because it does not address the probative valve of the evidence.
In response, the state writes, "As found by the district court, there are no
ICJis detailing what is and is not within the scope of an officer's duties, and to 'focus
in solely on the issue of the purported and alleged arrest' would be 'improper
comment upon the evidence."' Respondent's Brief, pg. 12, citing T pg. 291, ln. 10-20.
But this response is a non sequitur. The fact that there is no applicable pattern
instruction does not make the proposed instruction a comment on the evidence. Nor
does the fact that the proposed instruction focuses on legal propositions relevant to
the defense of the case make the instruction a comment on the evidence. If setting
forth the law was a comment on the evidence, the jury instructions on the elements
of the charged offenses would also be such comments as they focused solely upon the
state's theory of guilt. Thus, the fourth Fetterly requirement is present.

9

5.

Conclusion.

As all four parts of the Fetterly test are present here, the district court erred
in refusing Ms. Fields's proposed instruction.

The Error Is Not Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.
The state has not met its burden of proving the objected-to error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (2010).
Had the jury been properly instructed, it could have found that all three counts
occurred while the officers were not in the performance of their duties. As to Count I
and II, the jury could have found that Bowman and Robideau were actively engaged
in an illegal arrest at the time of the batteries. Likewise, the jury could have found
that Pagliaro was not performing his duties because Ms. Fields would not have been
in custody but for the illegal arrest. But even if the jury found that Pagliaro was
performing his duties when the acts in Count III occurred, that would not prevent it
from also concluding Bowman and Robideau were not performing their duties at the
time of Counts I and IL
III.

CONCLUSION

Ms. Fields asks the Court to vacate the judgments and sentences, and remand
the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this day 12th of December, 2019.

Isl Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Catheryn Fields
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in
compliance with all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic
copy was served on each party at the following email address(es): Idaho State
Attorney General, Criminal Law Division
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
Dated and certified this 12 th day of December, 2019.
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Dennis Benjamin
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